

# Internal Capital Frictions in Intermediaries and Exchange Rate Dynamics

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Can internal capital frictions in intermediaries explain covered interest rate parity deviations?

#### Summary

We investigate the role of internal capital frictions in explaining deviations from arbitrage conditions, in the context of the **covered interest rate parity**. We use changes in the profit and loss statement at different levels (foreign exchange derivatives trading desk, derivatives, fixed income, institution) to identify where the capital constraints bind, marking the limit of the firm within the balance sheet of large banks that intermediate the foreign exchange derivative market.

### **The Covered Interest Rate Parity and its Deviations**



#### The (UK-)European Market Infrastructure Regulation dataset

EMIR gives the Bank of England access to all the transactions of derivative contracts for which (at least) one counterparty is a UK entity. There are 129 fields to report, including date, price, quantity, counterparties, and value of the contract. The variation margin is this mark-to-market value of the contract. For FX forwards specifically, we have 4 million transactions outstanding, total notional value of USD 40 trillion, covering around 40% of the global market (Bank for International Settlements, 2022).

We use this dataset to investigate the market microstructure for FX forwards and highlight the role of specific large dealers, then use the variation margins on all outstanding contracts of these dealers as internal capital shocks.



• *F* is the forward rate Foreign/Home, and

 $b_T$  is the cross-currency basis, a premium or dis-Adequate setting to test internal capital frictions. Figure: Mechanism of the no-arbitrage condition.

 $t = T_2$ 

#### **Motivation and Review of the Literature**





**FX derivatives market microstructure**: OTC and intermediated by large dealers (2-tier structure: D2D and D2C segments).

- Theory: Search and matching (Weill, 2020) vs information acquisition / leakage (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2019).
- Empirics: Impact of the financial networks on price formation, e.g. Hau et al. (2021).
- Recent important changes: e-trading, RFQ, MTF, SI.

Figure: Distributions of all outstanding derivative contracts in the UK for a given day (8 April 2024). LHS: Open positions (24 million); RHS: notional values (USD782 trillion). Asset classes (inner circle) – CO: Commodity and emission allowances; CR: Credit; CU: Currency; EQ: Equity; IR: Interest Rate. Contract types (outer circle) – CD: Financial contracts for difference; FR: Forward rate agreements; FU: Futures; FW: Forwards; OP: Option; SB: Spreadbet; SW: Swap; ST: Swaption; OT: Other.



## Identification Strategy and First Results

#### There are significant changes in the markto-market values of outstanding derivative contracts of large dealers, leading to sizable variation margins. These are internal liquidity shocks that can prevent intermediaries

 $\blacktriangleright$  We confirm this structure with large, intermediating dealers. This explains why idiosyncratic shocks to dealers impact CIP deviations.

Figure: Counterparty network in EUR/USD FX forwards (Abad et al., 2016).

**Intermediary Asset Pricing**: Because of financial frictions, prices can move away from fundamentals and arbitrage conditions.

- Theory: Shleifer and Vishny (1997); FX determination and puzzles with an imperfect financial sector: Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021)
- Empirics on CIP violations after the Great Financial Crisis:
- Balance-sheet constraints (LR, LCR, NSFR) on regulated arbitrageurs: D et al. (2018), Cenedese et al. (2021); also impact unregulated ones: Boyarchenko et al. (2018).
- Funding segmentation: Sushko et al. (2016), Rime et al. (2022), Anderson et al. (2021).
- Margins on funding: Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011), Augustin et al. (2024).
- Growing evidence of *within* balance sheet segmentation: theoretically (Coase (1937), He and Xiong (2013)) and empirically, e.g. Mitchell et al. (2007), Duffie (2010), Siriwardane (2019), Siriwardane et al. (2023).
- > We study the role of **internal funding** in explaining CIP violations by measuring directly the funding shocks.
- Figure: Cross currency basis swap for major currencies (Bloomberg).



Date 05/0	7/2024 🗄	In Structure ✓ 1 Year	3 Year	Storicat Spread	✓ 10 Yea	nr Side	Mid
Cross Currer	icy Basis Swa	p Spreads	Quoted OIS \	s USD SOFR	•	Term	5 Year
🗹 Chart 🔹	🕫 View 👻	✤ Track	🖌 Annotate	۹. Zoom	Maximize >>	Curren	f Spread
						🗹 AUD	17.0
			Cross	Currency Basis Spre	eads: Mid 🗾 🚬	20 🗹 CHF	-28.8
			3 Y	ear		CLP	-4.5
			■ 5 Y	ear Vear		COP	124.0
							-13.5
						GBP	-8.2
					· · · -	INR	54.6
						JPY 20 ₽ ₽ ₽	-57.3
						<sup>2°</sup> ea SGD	-28.0
						IHB	-26.5
						IRY	38.5
						-40	
						-60	

from arbitraging CIP deviations away in currencies in which they are dominant. Figure: Gross market value of outstanding contracts (FX forwards, FX swaps and currency swaps, BIS, S1-2023).

Given the market structure of FX derivatives with dominant intermediaries, and the large P&L shocks on the balance sheets of these intermediaries, we want to test our hypothesis of slow moving internal capital explaining CIP deviations and thus map the limits of the firm through this regression:

$$\Delta b_{i,t} = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{J}} \beta_j \times \sum_{d(i) \in \mathbb{D}(i)} \omega_{d(i)} \Delta P \& L_{d(i),j,t-1} + controls_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

- $b_{i,t}$  is the basis swap at time t in currency pair i,
- J is the partition of the dealers' balance sheets into the foreign exchange derivatives trading desk, all the other derivatives, all the other fixed income activities, and the rest of the institution,
- $\mathbb{D}(i)$  is the set of the main dealers in currency pair *i*,
- $\omega_{d(i)}$  is the weight of dealer d(i) in currency pair i (degree / share of total notionals)
- $P\&L_{d(i), j, t}$  is the profit and loss statement of dealer d(i) at level j.

Because of endogeneity concerns, we want to use a Granular Instrumental Variables (Gabaix and Koijen, 2020)type approach by orthogonalizing the shocks (removing the equally-weighted effect of CIP deviation changes) and focusing on P&L shocks unrelated to the currency pair of interest.

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